If a questioner were to ask: The hadith of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him): (Whoever performs wudu; then that is good and excellent)

The questioner : If a questioner were to ask about the hadith of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him): ; does the Messenger (peace and blessings be upon him) praise one who leaves an obligatory act by saying to him: ?

The Shaykh : He does not stop if he said: and that is enough to answer the question. But since he completed it with his saying: ; then at that point the question is not answered. However, you should not take the answer in a way that opens the door to your doubt and question. My answer was not limited only to the fact that this hadith indicates virtue alone. I clarified that it is possible that this is in the first stage, as came the hadith: . If you performed ghusl on Friday, it is equal in indicating the virtue of Friday ghusl to the apparent meaning of this hadith: . But did the matter of the Messenger (peace be upon him) stop at only the encouragement, which contradicts recommendation and contradicts the obligation of Friday ghusl, or did he confirm it later in many hadiths from the first category?
Answer: Yes, and therefore the final conclusion is that the hadiths that confirm the obligation of Friday ghusl are stronger from the jurisprudential aspect, as they are also from the hadith aspect, as we mentioned earlier.
Your question reminds me of the necessity of alerting you to a principle from the principles of Islamic jurisprudence that helps the student of knowledge understand the rulings of the Shari'ah, especially when the Prophetic hadiths appear to contradict each other for him. From these usul principles is that one always and forever takes the additional ruling. The additional ruling in the rulings of the Shari'ah, for example, if evidence comes indicating the permissibility of a matter, then evidence comes indicating the virtue and recommendation of this matter, we do not remain with what the first evidence indicated of permissibility only, but we add to it what the other evidence indicated of recommendation. This is because recommendation does not contradict permissibility. Also, what falls under the previous rule is that one takes the additional, then the additional. If a hadith comes permitting something, and another hadith comes forbidding it, and we do not have knowledge of the date of the precedence of one text over the other; by which concept is it taken? By what the permitting hadith indicated, or by what the forbidding hadith indicated?
Answer: "If a forbidding text and a permitting text contradict, the forbidding is given precedence over the permitting." Do you understand the meaning of this statement? The reason that made the scholars adopt this rule is that it is known by necessary religious knowledge that when Allah (Mighty and Majestic) sent Muhammad (peace and blessings be upon him and his family) with prophethood and messengership, He did not reveal all the rulings of the Shari'ah in one paragraph, but these rulings came gradually. This is a matter agreed upon by everyone. The call of the Messenger (peace be upon him) and his primary concern was conveying the call of tawhid (the oneness of Allah) to the people, while the rulings of the Shari'ah came gradually.
Now a question arises here, I believe its answer is known. These things whose prohibition came later, what was their ruling in the beginning of Islam? There is no doubt that the answer was permissibility. Because, as came in the hadith, I mention it for its connection to this research first, and to alert to the weakness of its chain second; namely: the famous hadith in the Nawawi Forty: . So whatever of the rulings was silent about in the beginning of Islam, it is silent about, and silence about a thing means its permissibility. So before the prohibition of khamr (intoxicants), for example, what was the ruling of khamr? Of course, there was no text saying "drink khamr, and may it be good for you with khamr," but it was silent about it. And when some of the Companions entered the prayer while drunk, do you see if he drank khamr before the prayer while he had been informed by the Messenger (peace be upon him) that it is forbidden? Of course not. So what was the ruling of khamr in this case where this Companion and others drank it as in many hadiths? It was on the original silent state, which is permissibility. Then the prohibition came gradually as is known. We will not prolong this for you. For example, when gold was forbidden, before the prohibition of gold; what was the ruling of gold? Before the prohibition of silk, what was its ruling? All of that was silent about, so it was on permissibility. When the texts forbidding these things came, the scholars adopted them. And from here they said: "If two texts contradict, one permitting and the other forbidding; the forbidding is given precedence over the permitting."
All of this and that falls under a rule that Ibn Hazm (may Allah have mercy on him) often revolves around in his book "Al-Ihkam fi Usul al-Ahkam," especially in his discussion of the opponents in his other book "Al-Muhalla." He says: "It is obligatory to take the additional, then the additional of the rulings." If the original state of things is permissibility—and it is also a usul principle—the original state of things is permissibility. So we say, for example: Is it permissible to use this microphone? We say: It is permissible. Some might be overly strict and say: What is the evidence, and this is a newly invented matter? We say: The original state of things is permissibility. So when a prohibition comes, we stop at it and do not go beyond it. This is how the additional, then the additional of the rulings is taken.
If we know this rule, and it has many and very many branches, we return to applying it in the previously mentioned issue. The hadith of Aisha came as we mentioned: . This contains encouragement. Do you see what Friday ghusl was before the encouragement? It was like any ghusl a person performs for the sake of relaxation, or removing a bad smell, on the original permissibility. So when the hadith came: , it came with a new ruling, which is the encouragement to perform ghusl specifically for this day, Friday. Similarly, the hadith: indicates a new legislation, which is that this ghusl is better than limiting oneself to wudu, which is necessary on Friday; because the prayer is not valid except with it. When the hadiths from the first category came: , there is no doubt that this type indicated a matter additional to what the hadith of Aisha indicated, and what the other hadith indicated, which is from the hadith of Samurah ibn Jundub (may Allah have mercy on him). This rule must be memorized first, then applied in reconciling the hadiths that appear to contradict each other second.
Yes.

The questioner : ... .

The Shaykh : What is in this? This is an opinion. This opinion abrogates what the hadiths explicitly indicating obligation indicated. . This should not be opposed to the marfu' hadith, as it is said: "When the athar comes, the reasoning is invalid," and "When the river of Allah comes, the river of Ma'qil is invalid." What do you have?

Another questioner : Regarding the jurisprudential rule...

The Shaykh : ...as we explained earlier. And I hope you pay attention to what is said, so that you do not come with questions that have already been answered. We said: If a thing is recommended (mustahabb), and it is said to be a confirmed sunnah—for example; does the saying of sunnah contradict recommendation? We said: No. Why? Because what was a confirmed sunnah is better than what was recommended, correct? Good. So here there are three levels now in this issue of ours:
That it is said that Friday ghusl is recommended.
That it is said that Friday ghusl is a sunnah.
That it is said that Friday ghusl is obligatory.
This is good, and this is better. Both the good and the better fall under the category of obligation; because what is obligatory is better than what is a confirmed sunnah, and a fortiori, it is better than what is merely recommended. This is also the path of reconciliation. As I told you, we say that one should always take the full extent: if reconciliation is not possible, then if it is possible, there is no harm in returning to the rule we mentioned. Al-Hafiz Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani (may Allah have mercy on him) has a very beneficial treatise on the terminology of hadith, known as "Sharh al-Nukhba." There he says: "If two hadiths from the category of acceptable ones come into conflict"—and by acceptable he means those that are hasan or better—"and they contradict each other, what is the course of action?" He says: "The two contradictory hadiths should be reconciled by one of the methods of reconciliation." He intends this very brief answer because his treatise is based on brevity. But if we turn to the detailed books on terminology, we find them saying that the methods of reconciling contradictory hadiths number more than one hundred. More than one hundred! If the jurist is unable to reconcile the two contradictory hadiths by any of these many methods, to which Al-Hafiz Ibn Hajar only briefly alluded in his previous statement, he says: "If reconciliation is not possible, the abrogating and the abrogated are considered." That is, regarding the knowledge of which is earlier and which is later. It is said: the earlier one is abrogated, and the later one is the abrogator. If the abrogating and the abrogated are not clear to the researcher, he says: "Proceed to preference (tarjih)." Preference in terms of authenticity, meaning that if the two contradictory hadiths are such that one is hasan and the other is sahih, and reconciliation is not possible, nor is the abrogating and abrogated determined between them, then the sahih is preferred over the hasan. And if one of the two hadiths is a sahih that is solitary (gharib) and the other is a sahih that is widely transmitted (mustafid) or famous, and reconciliation is not possible, then the widely transmitted or famous one is preferred over the solitary sahih. And so on. If a famous or widely transmitted hadith contradicts a mutawatir hadith and reconciliation is not possible, the mutawatir hadith is taken, and the sahih mustafid or famous hadith is left.
The important point is that the original principle is reconciliation. But if a person is unable to reconcile, he proceeds to the second level, which is considering the abrogating and the abrogated. Otherwise, he proceeds to the third level, which is taking the more authentic of the two pieces of evidence in terms of authenticity. Then the Hafiz says at the end of his statement: "If they are equal in authenticity and preference between them is not possible, then the matter is left, and it is said: ."
It is not said, as the Hanafis say—regrettably, in some hadiths that appear to them to be contradictory, and they have not been able to reconcile this rule—they say, regrettably: "They contradicted each other, so they both fell away," meaning they turned away from acting on either of the two contradictory hadiths.
It is necessary to proceed in stages in acting on one of the hadiths according to this hadith and fiqh rule.