Conditions for the Permissibility of a Matter from the Perspective of Legitimate Public Interest?
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The questioner : Shaykh, we hear and sometimes read from some preachers on this same topic, and sometimes they expand into other subjects, saying: "We permit these things from the perspective of public interest for the sake of da'wah and the like." Sometimes they add to the term "public interest" a technical jurisprudential term that influences the minds of some enthusiastic young people, saying it is from the perspective of "unrestricted public interest." It would be desirable if you would shed light on this and respond to these doubts. May Allah reward you.
The Shaykh : It is not hidden from the people of knowledge that unrestricted public interest is a means that in itself is not contrary to the Shari'ah. If it achieves a legitimate public interest, then it is permissible or obligatory to adopt it; because first, it is a means not contrary to the Shari'ah, and second, it achieves a legitimate public interest. Although this rule is not absolute, as the Shaykh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyyah (may Allah have mercy on him) explained in his book "Iqtida' al-Sirat al-Mustaqim Mukhalafat Ahl al-Jahim," where he said: "Unrestricted public interest is not permissible to adopt absolutely; rather, it must be detailed." He mentioned the following briefly: "If the cause necessitating unrestricted public interest appears after the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings be upon him), then we look: Was adopting this cause established in the time of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him), yet he did not adopt it? Or was this cause not established? If it is the former, it is not permissible for Muslims to adopt this cause, even if they claim it achieves a legitimate public interest; because if this cause had been prescribed and was an action achieving a legitimate public interest, the Messenger (peace be upon him) would have been the most deserving of people to make it a prescribed cause and adopt it, because it achieves a legitimate public interest.
He said: "If the cause necessitating the adoption of unrestricted public interest was not established in the time of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him), we look at what motivates us to adopt it to achieve the public interest: Is it the negligence of Muslims in performing some of the rulings of the Shari'ah? If the cause for adopting this means is due to the negligence of Muslims in performing some of the rulings of the Shari'ah, then it is also not permissible to adopt this cause. Let it be said to them: Adopt what Allah has prescribed for you of means and prescribed causes; they are sufficient to achieve the desired public interest. This is the second aspect of this occurring cause.
The third and final aspect: If this cause necessitating its adoption is not the negligence of Muslims in performing some of the rulings of the Shari'ah, but rather they are adopting them, yet this cause also achieves for them an additional public interest beyond those prescribed means; here he says: It is permissible for us to adopt it."
If we keep this detail in mind and return to the question, the first thing that obstructs the legitimacy of adopting this means to achieve a legitimate public interest is that this means is not prescribed. If they return to saying that these forms are not forbidden, the discussion returns to where we were just now. But if they concede that this means is forbidden and not prescribed, then it is very easy to say to them: How do you make permissible the commission of a forbidden means to achieve a legitimate public interest in your claim? In reality, it is not permissible to adopt a cause that is not contrary to the Shari'ah if the Messenger (peace be upon him) did not adopt it to achieve a legitimate public interest. There is a very great difference between what I mentioned just now, for which there is evidence, that a cause was established, the necessitating factor for adopting it to achieve a public interest existed, and the Messenger did not adopt it; therefore, it is not permissible for us to adopt it. How can we adopt a means that the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings be upon him) forbade?
Therefore, in reality, those who issue these fatwas, in my opinion, adopt the disbelieving principle, which says: "The end justifies the means." And this, unfortunately, is a very widespread phenomenon among many Islamic writers who have not been given an ample share of knowledge. "The end justifies the means"—look, my brother, it achieves a public interest; they do not look at this scientific detail that Ibn Taymiyyah (may Allah have mercy on him) brought and clarified. It is good to mention some examples regarding the three categories, the most important of which is the category that says: If the cause occurred after it did not exist, and the necessitating factor for adopting it is the negligence of Muslims, then it is not permissible to adopt it. An example is the reality of Islamic states today, which impose taxes and monies on Muslim peoples, taking them from them against their will. Why? My brother, the interest of the state necessitates it. How can the state achieve the interests of the people without money? These people are told: Adopt the prescribed means of collecting money from the known zakahs in animals, for example, and fruits, and in some plants whose ruling is known in Islam, and bequests and the like of that which has no heir. Apply these rulings of the Shari'ah and collect these monies in the state treasury. At that time, if these monies are not sufficient to carry out the interests of the state and the interests of the Muslim people, it is possible for you to impose a new tax that corresponds to the need. But since you have turned away from the causes that Allah prescribed to enrich the state treasury, and you have come—after you have suspended them—with causes and laws you imposed from yourselves; it is not permissible to adopt these, claiming that they achieve the public interest; because this public interest has been achieved by the Lawgiver with a prescription from which you turned away.
This is one of the examples that clarifies that not everything that achieves a public interest must be clung to by us, but rather it must be studied in light of the rulings of the Shari'ah. On the contrary, for example, and this may be hidden from many students of knowledge, is the legitimacy of Uthman's second adhan. This is a means that Uthman adopted. There is no doubt that this means was not in the time of the Messenger (peace be upon him). But what Ibn Taymiyyah indicated in his previous speech is that the necessitating factor was found in the time of Uthman and was not present in the time of the Messenger (peace be upon him); because, as he says,The questioner : the one who wanted Uthman (may Allah be pleased with him) to add the second adhan was that houses had multiplied around the Prophet's Mosque, and the owners of these houses no longer heard the adhan from the Prophet's Mosque; so he made a second adhan in a known place, "al-Zuray'ah," to be heard by those far away in their houses from the Prophet's Mosque. This cause was found after the Messenger (peace be upon him) first, and second, this cause did not arise due to the negligence of Muslims in performing some of the rulings of the Shari'ah, as we exemplified just now regarding the laws imposed on some Islamic peoples in the form of taxes. And therefore, Uthman's adhan was not a subject of denial from the Companions who were with him at that time, but rather it was established because it does not fall under the category of innovation in religion, but rather falls under the category of adopting unrestricted public interest.
Its example is exactly the broadcasting of the adhan as you hear it on the loudspeaker. This is a means that occurred, and the Muslims' negligence in performing some of the rulings of the Shari'ah is not the cause for adopting this means. No. And therefore, it is permissible for us, and in light of the hadiths that indicate that the mu'adhdhin should be one with a loud, resonant voice; so this loudspeaker or this broadcasting achieves a legitimate meaning. This means was not present in the time of the Messenger (peace be upon him); it occurred now, and its occurrence is not the result of the Muslims' negligence in performing the rulings of the Shari'ah; therefore, it is permissible for us to adopt it.
But look now at how the issues differ. I am saying something you may not have heard before, but I swear by Allah that I believe broadcasting the adhan (the call to prayer) over a loudspeaker is a legitimate religious benefit, whereas broadcasting the iqamah (the second call) by the same means is not a legitimate religious benefit. This is because the Wise Lawgiver, when He prescribed the adhan and the iqamah, distinguished between them: He placed the adhan on the roof of the mosque and the iqamah inside the mosque. He placed the adhan on the roof so that the mu'adhdhin's (the one who calls to prayer) voice would reach as far as possible, and He encouraged this mu'adhdhin to have a loud voice. As for the iqamah, He placed it between the four walls of the mosque, and it is attached to the iqamah in this regard. Therefore, it is not prescribed to broadcast the imam's recitation on Friday, especially, nor in the five daily prayers in general, to the outside of the mosque. This is because the purpose of this recitation is not to make it heard by everyone, but rather to make it heard by those who are praying in the mosque. Accordingly, I see that the current state of the Muslim world, which does not distinguish between broadcasting the adhan, the iqamah, and the recitation, is an ugly mixing of what is prescribed and what is not prescribed. All of this is done with careful attention to applying the rule of unrestricted public interests (maslakh mursalah). This is what we say, and we swear by Allah to it.
The questioner : May Allah reward you with good.
The Shaykh : It is not hidden from the people of knowledge that unrestricted public interest is a means that in itself is not contrary to the Shari'ah. If it achieves a legitimate public interest, then it is permissible or obligatory to adopt it; because first, it is a means not contrary to the Shari'ah, and second, it achieves a legitimate public interest. Although this rule is not absolute, as the Shaykh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyyah (may Allah have mercy on him) explained in his book "Iqtida' al-Sirat al-Mustaqim Mukhalafat Ahl al-Jahim," where he said: "Unrestricted public interest is not permissible to adopt absolutely; rather, it must be detailed." He mentioned the following briefly: "If the cause necessitating unrestricted public interest appears after the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings be upon him), then we look: Was adopting this cause established in the time of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him), yet he did not adopt it? Or was this cause not established? If it is the former, it is not permissible for Muslims to adopt this cause, even if they claim it achieves a legitimate public interest; because if this cause had been prescribed and was an action achieving a legitimate public interest, the Messenger (peace be upon him) would have been the most deserving of people to make it a prescribed cause and adopt it, because it achieves a legitimate public interest.
He said: "If the cause necessitating the adoption of unrestricted public interest was not established in the time of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him), we look at what motivates us to adopt it to achieve the public interest: Is it the negligence of Muslims in performing some of the rulings of the Shari'ah? If the cause for adopting this means is due to the negligence of Muslims in performing some of the rulings of the Shari'ah, then it is also not permissible to adopt this cause. Let it be said to them: Adopt what Allah has prescribed for you of means and prescribed causes; they are sufficient to achieve the desired public interest. This is the second aspect of this occurring cause.
The third and final aspect: If this cause necessitating its adoption is not the negligence of Muslims in performing some of the rulings of the Shari'ah, but rather they are adopting them, yet this cause also achieves for them an additional public interest beyond those prescribed means; here he says: It is permissible for us to adopt it."
If we keep this detail in mind and return to the question, the first thing that obstructs the legitimacy of adopting this means to achieve a legitimate public interest is that this means is not prescribed. If they return to saying that these forms are not forbidden, the discussion returns to where we were just now. But if they concede that this means is forbidden and not prescribed, then it is very easy to say to them: How do you make permissible the commission of a forbidden means to achieve a legitimate public interest in your claim? In reality, it is not permissible to adopt a cause that is not contrary to the Shari'ah if the Messenger (peace be upon him) did not adopt it to achieve a legitimate public interest. There is a very great difference between what I mentioned just now, for which there is evidence, that a cause was established, the necessitating factor for adopting it to achieve a public interest existed, and the Messenger did not adopt it; therefore, it is not permissible for us to adopt it. How can we adopt a means that the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings be upon him) forbade?
Therefore, in reality, those who issue these fatwas, in my opinion, adopt the disbelieving principle, which says: "The end justifies the means." And this, unfortunately, is a very widespread phenomenon among many Islamic writers who have not been given an ample share of knowledge. "The end justifies the means"—look, my brother, it achieves a public interest; they do not look at this scientific detail that Ibn Taymiyyah (may Allah have mercy on him) brought and clarified. It is good to mention some examples regarding the three categories, the most important of which is the category that says: If the cause occurred after it did not exist, and the necessitating factor for adopting it is the negligence of Muslims, then it is not permissible to adopt it. An example is the reality of Islamic states today, which impose taxes and monies on Muslim peoples, taking them from them against their will. Why? My brother, the interest of the state necessitates it. How can the state achieve the interests of the people without money? These people are told: Adopt the prescribed means of collecting money from the known zakahs in animals, for example, and fruits, and in some plants whose ruling is known in Islam, and bequests and the like of that which has no heir. Apply these rulings of the Shari'ah and collect these monies in the state treasury. At that time, if these monies are not sufficient to carry out the interests of the state and the interests of the Muslim people, it is possible for you to impose a new tax that corresponds to the need. But since you have turned away from the causes that Allah prescribed to enrich the state treasury, and you have come—after you have suspended them—with causes and laws you imposed from yourselves; it is not permissible to adopt these, claiming that they achieve the public interest; because this public interest has been achieved by the Lawgiver with a prescription from which you turned away.
This is one of the examples that clarifies that not everything that achieves a public interest must be clung to by us, but rather it must be studied in light of the rulings of the Shari'ah. On the contrary, for example, and this may be hidden from many students of knowledge, is the legitimacy of Uthman's second adhan. This is a means that Uthman adopted. There is no doubt that this means was not in the time of the Messenger (peace be upon him). But what Ibn Taymiyyah indicated in his previous speech is that the necessitating factor was found in the time of Uthman and was not present in the time of the Messenger (peace be upon him); because, as he says,The questioner : the one who wanted Uthman (may Allah be pleased with him) to add the second adhan was that houses had multiplied around the Prophet's Mosque, and the owners of these houses no longer heard the adhan from the Prophet's Mosque; so he made a second adhan in a known place, "al-Zuray'ah," to be heard by those far away in their houses from the Prophet's Mosque. This cause was found after the Messenger (peace be upon him) first, and second, this cause did not arise due to the negligence of Muslims in performing some of the rulings of the Shari'ah, as we exemplified just now regarding the laws imposed on some Islamic peoples in the form of taxes. And therefore, Uthman's adhan was not a subject of denial from the Companions who were with him at that time, but rather it was established because it does not fall under the category of innovation in religion, but rather falls under the category of adopting unrestricted public interest.
Its example is exactly the broadcasting of the adhan as you hear it on the loudspeaker. This is a means that occurred, and the Muslims' negligence in performing some of the rulings of the Shari'ah is not the cause for adopting this means. No. And therefore, it is permissible for us, and in light of the hadiths that indicate that the mu'adhdhin should be one with a loud, resonant voice; so this loudspeaker or this broadcasting achieves a legitimate meaning. This means was not present in the time of the Messenger (peace be upon him); it occurred now, and its occurrence is not the result of the Muslims' negligence in performing the rulings of the Shari'ah; therefore, it is permissible for us to adopt it.
But look now at how the issues differ. I am saying something you may not have heard before, but I swear by Allah that I believe broadcasting the adhan (the call to prayer) over a loudspeaker is a legitimate religious benefit, whereas broadcasting the iqamah (the second call) by the same means is not a legitimate religious benefit. This is because the Wise Lawgiver, when He prescribed the adhan and the iqamah, distinguished between them: He placed the adhan on the roof of the mosque and the iqamah inside the mosque. He placed the adhan on the roof so that the mu'adhdhin's (the one who calls to prayer) voice would reach as far as possible, and He encouraged this mu'adhdhin to have a loud voice. As for the iqamah, He placed it between the four walls of the mosque, and it is attached to the iqamah in this regard. Therefore, it is not prescribed to broadcast the imam's recitation on Friday, especially, nor in the five daily prayers in general, to the outside of the mosque. This is because the purpose of this recitation is not to make it heard by everyone, but rather to make it heard by those who are praying in the mosque. Accordingly, I see that the current state of the Muslim world, which does not distinguish between broadcasting the adhan, the iqamah, and the recitation, is an ugly mixing of what is prescribed and what is not prescribed. All of this is done with careful attention to applying the rule of unrestricted public interests (maslakh mursalah). This is what we say, and we swear by Allah to it.
The questioner : May Allah reward you with good.
Source
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The Arabic text is copied verbatim from the original source, without any edits.
