The Categories of the Actions of Servants

The Shaykh: And when we study the reality of the accountable human being from the psychological aspect related to each of us, we will find that everything that issues from him in terms of actions must be of two categories: one category in which he has pure choice and does not feel any compulsion in it, and another category which is the exact opposite, in which he feels and knows and perceives that he has no choice in it; that is compulsion. But this category does not relate to any aspect of accountability, nor reward, nor punishment, nor reckoning. Rather, all of this relates to the first category, namely the category in which he has choice. For example, we distinguish between what issues from a person by his choice, intending it, and what issues from him by necessity, in which he has no desire at all. For instance, right now I am speaking; I feel and perceive and know that there are two movements or two types of movement. The first is my mouth and my tongue, and perhaps something of my body, my hand. Does anyone doubt that I am fully voluntary in this type of movement? And on the contrary, I find in myself here a movement inside, which is the pulsations of the heart and the effects of this pulsation in the vein here. I have no choice in this type. This type is like what is said that a person is compelled to do. As for the first type, my speech and my gestures, this is a clear example of a person being fully voluntary. Each of us distinguishes between this movement by which I am gesturing and the movement of one afflicted with a type of illness, and by a third example, such as the one whose hand trembles against his will, or the one imposed upon himThe Shaykh : and the shaking where its owner has reached extreme old age, so we find his hand trembling from his old age. He has no choice in this movement. So the distinction between the movement of the voluntary and the movement of the compelled is a necessary distinction that a person feels and perceives with his senses. So it is necessary to affirm this distinction, especially since the Wise Lawgiver has ruled with this distinction. If a person threw a bird and hit a person, this, as is known, is accidental killing. The Wise Lawgiver does not hold this person accountable and does not consider him a criminal killer. On the contrary, the other person who intentionally killed a person is punished for it. The reason is clear, which is that he did it by his choice. This distinction is not possible because the Lawgiver distinguished between... his action... No, but because reality and perception testify that this is intentional killing and this is accidental killing. So the actions of a person, in terms of their relation to him, are not all ones in which he is voluntary, and the opposite is also not the case, namely that he is compelled to all of them. Rather, some are like this and some are like that. When we know these two realities, the legal and the actual, we return to the divine decree. The divine decree has recorded what will happen from every accountable person as it happened from him. So the one who, for example, killed intentionally is recorded in the Preserved Tablet in the divine decree before the killing happened from him that he kills a worker intentionally. And that other killing that happens accidentally is written in the Preserved Tablet that he kills accidentally. So the divine decree, as we said, is an estimation based on the divine knowledge—Glorified and Exalted is He—and the divine knowledge is knowledge that encompassed everything with knowledge; nothing is hidden from Him on earth or in the sky. So intentional killing is recorded in the divine decree as intentional killing, and accidental killing is recorded in the Tablet or in the divine decree as accidental killing. When we know that, the argument of the Jabriyyah is refuted, where they said: as long as there is a decree, it must be accompanied by compulsion. Because we say that the decree is of two categories, because it is an exploration of reality, and reality is of two categories: a category of action done under compulsion and a category of action done voluntarily. So this is not equal to that, and all of it is decree. So what Allah decreed for a person by his choice, he is held accountable for it because he did it by his choice. And no one of us ever feels—and this is the example now, as I said in my speech—no one feels, whether the one in whom the movement occurred or the one who witnessed it, because this person is compelled. How can it be said, "I am compelled," while I am speaking by pure choice, and then if I wish, I stop immediately? And I am stopping now. So where is the compulsion? The claim of compulsion in all the movements of a person is the very falsehood legally and actually. But there is a heart that pulses and moves which I do not control. There is a matter imposed on me in my stature, in my height, in my color, in the features of my body and face, and the like. And each of you is the same. Does he have any choice in that? No. Here we are created males, and those are created females. Do they have choice in that? No. So it is necessary to distinguish between matters that Allah created against our will, in which we have no choice, and other matters on the basis of which He said: ; because we have the choice. He did not say to us—for example—"whoever among you wishes to be male, let him be male, and whoever among you wishes to be female, let her be female." There is nothing imposed on us by imposition in which we have no choice. So this is a decree accompanied by compulsion from the divine estimation, and that type is a divine decree accompanied by choice. So there is no argument for the Jabriyyah in their saying that the decree is equal to compulsion, because this is first a denial of reality and a denial of the Shari'ah, which distinguished in the Shari'ah's treatment of people between the voluntary and the compelled. Where do we go with this distinction when we say, "We are the decree is equal to compulsion"? So the claim falls, because compulsion follows from the decree. And consequently, the denial of the Mu'tazilah of the decree is refuted, because the reason for the denial was due to their participation with the Jabriyyah in their understanding of the decree as compulsion. The most that can be said is that the Mu'tazilah noticed the falsity of compulsion, but they said: as long as the decree necessitates compulsion, then there is no decree. So both parties, the Jabriyyah and the Mu'tazilah, are refuted, except that the refutation of one of them is more dangerous than the other.