(Clarifying that the attribute is necessary for the attributed, is part of the essence of the self, and is not separable from it, thereby removing the doubt of composition) If it were attributed, it would be so attributed, and this
Machine translationRead the Arabic original
The Shaykh :"If it were attributed, it would be so attributed, and this is the essence of the proof"
This is the essence of its proof: if it were possessed of attributes, it would be possessed of attributes; if it were composed, it would be composed.
"So if you make the term "composition" in the *** correct meaning a sign of invalidity,
we come to the meaning and extract it from *** it, and we discard it with a contemptible discard."
Yes, "it is a detestable term", and so on.
If you make the term "composition" in its correct meaning a sign of invalidity, we come to the meaning and extract it from it. So we say that composition between the attributed and the attribute is not impossible, and there is no composition between two distinct things, because the attribute is necessary for the attributed, and there is no attributed without an attribute. And thus we remove this doubt and say that the attribute, in relation to the attributed, is not considered composition, and this is not considered multiplicity, because it is of its essence, of the essence of the attributed, just as we said that the existence of a thing is the very essence of that thing.
This is the essence of its proof: if it were possessed of attributes, it would be possessed of attributes; if it were composed, it would be composed.
"So if you make the term "composition" in the *** correct meaning a sign of invalidity,
we come to the meaning and extract it from *** it, and we discard it with a contemptible discard."
Yes, "it is a detestable term", and so on.
If you make the term "composition" in its correct meaning a sign of invalidity, we come to the meaning and extract it from it. So we say that composition between the attributed and the attribute is not impossible, and there is no composition between two distinct things, because the attribute is necessary for the attributed, and there is no attributed without an attribute. And thus we remove this doubt and say that the attribute, in relation to the attributed, is not considered composition, and this is not considered multiplicity, because it is of its essence, of the essence of the attributed, just as we said that the existence of a thing is the very essence of that thing.