Explanation of the author's statement: "And the casual oath that slips from one's tongue without intention, such as saying 'No, by Allah' or 'Yes, by Allah,' and likewise an oath one makes while believing in the truth of one's own self, which then turns out to be otherwise"
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The Shaykh : All right, he says "the casual oath that slips from one's tongue". "Casual" is the subject, and "which" is the predicate of the subject. That is why it is appropriate here to use a separating pronoun to make it clear that "which" is the predicate, because the reader might think that "which" is a description of "casual." The casual oath that slips from the tongue without intention, and one expects what? The predicate. So if the author had said "it is the one that," it would have been clearer. In any case, we say that the casual oath that slips from one's tongue without intention means that his tongue precedes him and he does not intend it. There is no expiation for this by the text of the Qur'an. Allah the Exalted said: [Al-Baqarah 2:225] Yes, and by what conditions does it fall outside the conditions or restrictions of a binding oath?
The questioner : ... .
The Shaykh : Yes, from his statement "intending to make it". If it is a casual oath, one did not intend to make it, so it is not a binding oath. Always, your friend says to you, for example, "Do you want to go with us to so-and-so?" and you say, "No, by Allah, I am not going." You swear, but did you intend this oath? No. Therefore, there is no expiation for it because you did not intend it; it is from the casual oath. All right.
The author said "such as saying 'No, by Allah' or 'Yes, by Allah'". All right, what is the evidence that this is from the casual oath? The evidence is the verse[Al-Ma'idah 5:89] and in another verse [Al-Baqarah 2:225] "and hearts do not earn except what is intended," because what is not intended is not from the earning of the heart. There is also a marfu' hadith from 'A'ishah (may Allah be pleased with her) where he said: "The casual oath is a man's speech in his home: 'No, by Allah' or 'Yes, by Allah'". "A man's speech in his home" means that he does not intend this, he does not intend the oath or the binding.
The author said "such as saying 'No, by Allah' or 'Yes, by Allah'". This is a type of casual oath. Another type, according to what the author followed, is "and likewise an oath one makes while believing in the truth of one's own self." It is, in his opinion, from the casual oath. He made it and intended it, but he believes in the truth of his own self, and then the matter turns out to be otherwise. For example, he says, "By Allah, such and such happened yesterday," believing that it happened, but it did not happen. So he made the oath and believes he is truthful, but in reality he is not truthful, meaning it turned out to be otherwise, but he still believes that this is the reality. Another example: he said, "So-and-so attended the lesson last night. By Allah, he attended. By Allah, he attended." The students said, "He never attended." They all agreed that he did not attend, and the reality became that he did not attend. The author says, is this from what?
The questioner : From the casual oath.
The Shaykh : From the casual oath. What restriction did it lack?
The questioner : ... .
The Shaykh : Intending the binding, intending the oath.
The questioner : ... .
The Shaykh : Yes, regarding the future. This is about something in the past. He says he attended yesterday. Is yesterday past or future?
The questioner : Past.
The Shaykh : Past. And he said, "By Allah, so-and-so attended the lesson last night, Saturday night," and it turned out that he did not attend. We say there is no expiation for this because it is from the casual oath. If someone asks, "Is it correct to call it from the casual oath when the man did intend it?" The answer is that this is what the author saw, and it is in the ruling of the casual oath. But the correct view is that it is not from the casual oath, and that it is a binding oath, but there is no breaking of the oath in it, because in reality he is truthful, not a breaker of the oath. Because when he says, "By Allah, he did not attend" or "By Allah, he attended," what does he believe? Ah?
The questioner : His attendance.
The Shaykh : His attendance. And he says, "I still, to this day, believe in his attendance." But considering that the witnesses testified that he did not attend, they are more certain than I am, and I am still, to this very moment, in my belief that he attended. So it is not from the casual oath. And based on this reasoning that we see, if he swore about a future matter that it would happen based on his strong belief, and then it did not happen.
The questioner : ... .
The Shaykh : According to the madhhab, it is a binding oath with an expiation if the matter turns out to be otherwise, because it is about the future. So if he says, based on his belief, "By Allah, Zayd will definitely come tomorrow," he swore because Zayd, whom we spoke to yesterday, said, "I will come, if Allah wills, the day after tomorrow," and Zayd knows that he is a truthful man. So he said, "By Allah, Zayd will come tomorrow," based on what? His belief. Tomorrow passed and Zayd did not come. The madhhab is that he owes the expiation because this oath is binding regarding the future, and it was possible but did not happen, so he owes the expiation. And according to what we have adopted, he does not owe an expiation because this man is truthful in his oath, as he has not ceased and does not cease to say, "I swore to what I believe, and this is my belief." As for it happening contrary to the belief, that is not from me. Yes, and this is the choice of Shaykh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyyah (may Allah have mercy on him) that if he swore about a future matter based on his belief and then it did not happen, he does not owe an expiation. Is divorce like an oath in this matter? The correct view is that it is like an oath, and the madhhab is that it is not like an oath in both cases, meaning that the divorce takes place absolutely, and likewise manumission. And it will come, if Allah wills, in the chapter that follows.
(May Allah have mercy on him). The second condition for what? For the obligation of the expiation. The obligation of the expiation. In reality, the obligation of the expiation has more conditions than what the author mentioned, and they are taken from the author's own words. But now we will proceed according to the number of the author, and then we will look.
Allah does not impose blame upon you for what is unintentional in your oaths
لا يؤاخذكم الله باللغو في أيمانكمThe questioner : ... .
The Shaykh : Yes, from his statement "intending to make it". If it is a casual oath, one did not intend to make it, so it is not a binding oath. Always, your friend says to you, for example, "Do you want to go with us to so-and-so?" and you say, "No, by Allah, I am not going." You swear, but did you intend this oath? No. Therefore, there is no expiation for it because you did not intend it; it is from the casual oath. All right.
The author said "such as saying 'No, by Allah' or 'Yes, by Allah'". All right, what is the evidence that this is from the casual oath? The evidence is the verse
Allah will not impose blame upon you for what is meaningless in your oaths, but He will impose blame upon you for [breaking] what you intended of oaths
لا يؤاخذكم الله باللغو في أيمانكم ولكن يؤاخذكم بما عقّدّتم الأيمانbut He imposes blame upon you for what your hearts have earned
ولكن يؤاخذكم بما كسبت قلوبكمThe author said "such as saying 'No, by Allah' or 'Yes, by Allah'". This is a type of casual oath. Another type, according to what the author followed, is "and likewise an oath one makes while believing in the truth of one's own self." It is, in his opinion, from the casual oath. He made it and intended it, but he believes in the truth of his own self, and then the matter turns out to be otherwise. For example, he says, "By Allah, such and such happened yesterday," believing that it happened, but it did not happen. So he made the oath and believes he is truthful, but in reality he is not truthful, meaning it turned out to be otherwise, but he still believes that this is the reality. Another example: he said, "So-and-so attended the lesson last night. By Allah, he attended. By Allah, he attended." The students said, "He never attended." They all agreed that he did not attend, and the reality became that he did not attend. The author says, is this from what?
The questioner : From the casual oath.
The Shaykh : From the casual oath. What restriction did it lack?
The questioner : ... .
The Shaykh : Intending the binding, intending the oath.
The questioner : ... .
The Shaykh : Yes, regarding the future. This is about something in the past. He says he attended yesterday. Is yesterday past or future?
The questioner : Past.
The Shaykh : Past. And he said, "By Allah, so-and-so attended the lesson last night, Saturday night," and it turned out that he did not attend. We say there is no expiation for this because it is from the casual oath. If someone asks, "Is it correct to call it from the casual oath when the man did intend it?" The answer is that this is what the author saw, and it is in the ruling of the casual oath. But the correct view is that it is not from the casual oath, and that it is a binding oath, but there is no breaking of the oath in it, because in reality he is truthful, not a breaker of the oath. Because when he says, "By Allah, he did not attend" or "By Allah, he attended," what does he believe? Ah?
The questioner : His attendance.
The Shaykh : His attendance. And he says, "I still, to this day, believe in his attendance." But considering that the witnesses testified that he did not attend, they are more certain than I am, and I am still, to this very moment, in my belief that he attended. So it is not from the casual oath. And based on this reasoning that we see, if he swore about a future matter that it would happen based on his strong belief, and then it did not happen.
The questioner : ... .
The Shaykh : According to the madhhab, it is a binding oath with an expiation if the matter turns out to be otherwise, because it is about the future. So if he says, based on his belief, "By Allah, Zayd will definitely come tomorrow," he swore because Zayd, whom we spoke to yesterday, said, "I will come, if Allah wills, the day after tomorrow," and Zayd knows that he is a truthful man. So he said, "By Allah, Zayd will come tomorrow," based on what? His belief. Tomorrow passed and Zayd did not come. The madhhab is that he owes the expiation because this oath is binding regarding the future, and it was possible but did not happen, so he owes the expiation. And according to what we have adopted, he does not owe an expiation because this man is truthful in his oath, as he has not ceased and does not cease to say, "I swore to what I believe, and this is my belief." As for it happening contrary to the belief, that is not from me. Yes, and this is the choice of Shaykh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyyah (may Allah have mercy on him) that if he swore about a future matter based on his belief and then it did not happen, he does not owe an expiation. Is divorce like an oath in this matter? The correct view is that it is like an oath, and the madhhab is that it is not like an oath in both cases, meaning that the divorce takes place absolutely, and likewise manumission. And it will come, if Allah wills, in the chapter that follows.
(May Allah have mercy on him). The second condition for what? For the obligation of the expiation. The obligation of the expiation. In reality, the obligation of the expiation has more conditions than what the author mentioned, and they are taken from the author's own words. But now we will proceed according to the number of the author, and then we will look.