That the removal of the evil does not lead to something more evil, with an example.

The Shaykh : One of the conditions is that the removal of the evil does not lead to something more evil. That is, you do not forbid an evil, only for the one forbidden to do something greater and more evil. The evidence for this is the saying of Allah the Exalted: It is obligatory to revile the gods of the polytheists, and it is obligatory to criticize them. However, if this leads to reviling the Lord of the Worlds, who is free from every defect and shortcoming, then it becomes obligatory for us to leave off reviling the gods of the polytheists. Because if we reviled their gods, they would revile our God (Mighty and Majestic). So we do not revile the gods, because this evil leads to something more evil and more severe. Therefore, leaving off the reviling of their gods is obligatory if reviling the gods leads to reviling Allah. It was mentioned regarding Shaykh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyyah (may Allah have mercy on him) that he passed by a group of Tatars in Sham who were drinking alcohol. Is drinking alcohol an evil or a good? It is an evil, there is no doubt, by the consensus of the Muslims. But he did not forbid them; he did not forbid them from drinking. He had a companion with him, a companion of Shaykh al-Islam, and the companion said, "Why did you not forbid them?" He said, "If we forbade them from drinking alcohol, they would go and plunder the wealth of the Muslims and corrupt their women. Plundering the wealth of the Muslims and corrupting their women is greater than their drinking alcohol, because the harm of their drinking alcohol does not extend beyond them, whereas the harm of plundering the wealth of the Muslims and corrupting their women extends beyond them, affecting others. And the harm that is confined to its doer is lighter than the harm that extends to others. This is from the wisdom of Shaykh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyyah (may Allah have mercy on him). The important point is that it is a condition that the removal of the evil does not lead to something more evil. Now, is it a condition that the one who enjoins good must be doing it, and the one who forbids evil must be avoiding it, or is it not a condition? It is not a condition. Because if we made this a condition, there would be no enjoining of good and no forbidding of evil, because there is no person who is not lacking in some good or doing some evil. All the sons of Adam are sinners, and the best of sinners are those who repent. So we say: It is obligatory to enjoin good even if you are not doing it, and to forbid evil even if you are doing it. Because if you left off enjoining good while you are not doing it, you would have left off two things that are commanded: your own doing of it, and your enjoining of it.