Continuation of the conditions for enjoining good and forbidding evil.

The Shaykh : If a man does something that is not an act of worship, should we forbid him from it? No, not until we know that it is wrong, because the original ruling for matters other than acts of worship is permissibility. Is that right or not? Good.
The fourth condition: That this one who enjoins and forbids, according to the opinion of some scholars, or according to consensus, must be practicing what he enjoins and abstaining from what he forbids. If he is not practicing it, then he does not enjoin good or forbid evil, because Allah the Exalted said to the Jews, or to the Children of Israel, rebuking them: So if this man does not pray, he does not command others to pray, and if he drinks intoxicants, he does not forbid others from drinking intoxicants. How can he command something he does not do, or forbid something he does? Yes. For this reason, the poet said:
"Do not forbid a trait while you commit its like; *** If you do so, it is a great disgrace upon you."
They argued using the Qur'an and using reason, meaning using the athar (reports) and reflection. But the majority are of the opposite opinion, and they said: It is obligatory for him to enjoin good even if he does not do it, and to forbid evil even if he does it. Allah did not forbid, and Allah did not rebuke the Children of Israel, for not enjoining good or righteousness, but for combining the enjoining of righteousness with neglecting themselves. The prohibition or the rebuke is directed at the combined picture, not at each individual part. And this is the correct opinion, because we say: You are now commanded to do two things: The first command is to do righteousness, and the second command is to enjoin righteousness.
You are forbidden from two things: The first is the evil, and the second is the forbidding of it. You are now commanded to do two things: The first is to avoid the evil, and the second is to forbid its commission. If you leave one thing, you leave the second. This does not hold up. The correct view is that this is not a condition.
The fifth condition: That no harm befalls him. If harm befalls him, it is not obligatory for him. But if he is patient, if he is patient, there is no harm; it is better. But if he is not patient and harm befalls him because of it, then it is not obligatory for him, because all obligatory acts are conditioned by what? By ability and capacity. If he is unable, then it is not binding on him, because this is harm to him. And Allah the Exalted said: So if he fears that if he commands a person to do good, he will be killed, then it is not binding on him to command him, because he is unable to do so.
And some scholars said: "Rather, patience and commanding are obligatory upon him, and he should be patient with what befalls him." But the first opinion is better, because if this one who enjoins and forbids is subjected to harm by imprisonment, beating, killing, or the like, then he forbids others from what he is doing in enjoining good and forbidding evil in another aspect. And perhaps others will also desist from enjoining good and forbidding evil, even in a situation where that harm is not feared.
The sixth condition: That the evil not be replaced by something more evil. If the evil is replaced by something more evil, then it is not binding on him; rather, it is not permissible for him to enjoin good or forbid evil. So if commanding a recommended act leads to leaving an obligatory act, does he command the recommended act or not? No, he does not command. Meaning, he intended to command a person to do a good deed, but doing this good deed entails that he does not pray in congregation. Here, it is not obligatory to enjoin this good, rather it is not permissible, because it leads to leaving an obligatory act.
Likewise, regarding evil: If forbidding this evil causes the doer of the evil to commit a greater evil, then in this case, yes, it is not permissible to forbid this evil, in order to avert the greater of two harms by the lesser. And indicating this is the saying of Allah the Exalted: So cursing the gods of the polytheists is undoubtedly a required matter, but it leads to a forbidden matter that is greater than the benefit that would be in cursing the gods of the polytheists. Because they curse Allah the Exalted, who does not deserve to be cursed, and they only curse Him as an enemy without knowledge. And we curse their gods truly with knowledge. But if this truth with knowledge leads to this harm, then it is not permissible.
So if we see a person drinking intoxicants, and drinking intoxicants is evil, if we forbid him from drinking it, he will go and steal the money of people and make lawful their honor by committing zina with their women, or the like. Here, do we forbid him from drinking intoxicants or not? We forbid him. Why? Because it leads to a greater harm. He leaves drinking intoxicants, but he goes and commits zina with the chaste believing women, or he goes and transgresses against people in their money and blood. So we say: This is the lesser harm. And restricting oneself to the lesser of two harms is the wisdom. Good. So how many conditions are there now? Six conditions.
For this reason, the author said: "In accordance with what the Shari'ah obligates."
Good. Is it a condition that the one who enjoins and forbids not be from the roots of the one being commanded, or not? Meaning, that he not be his father or his mother or his grandfather or his grandmother? It is not a condition. Rather, we say: Perhaps this becomes more emphasized, because dutifulness to parents includes preventing them from committing sins. For this reason, the Messenger (peace and blessings be upon him) said: So if your father and your mother, when you command them to do good and forbid them from evil, that is from dutifulness and excellence toward them, and it is a victory for them over themselves. One might say: If I forbid my father, he gets angry, he gets upset, and he boycotts me. What do I do? We say: The anger, the upset, and the boycott are your right. It is your right. So be patient with this harm that befalls you from your father's anger, upset, and boycott. Be patient with it, and the outcome is for the righteous.
One might say: For example, if I tell my father, "Do not smoke," or "Do not leave the Fajr prayer, establish the prayer," he gets upset and says, "What are you? This is a new religion. You are a fanatic," or the like. In fact, some people say, if you command them with a command that does not burden them, "You are a fanatic." Even the one who commands prayer is sometimes called a fanatic. Good. What is the word "fanatic"? The one who commands prayer is called a fanatic. I did not command you to be imprisoned in your house or not to go out, nor did I command you to remain always bowing and prostrating. So where is the fanaticism?
In any case, there are some people who complain about this matter. They say, "If I command my father to do an obligatory act, not a recommended one, or to leave a forbidden thing, not a disliked one, he gets upset, angry, and boycotts me." We say: It is obligatory for you to command him to do that and to forbid him, and this is not harm. Meaning, his boycotting you and his anger toward you is not harm. Rather, it is what? It is annoyance. And there is a difference between annoyance and harm. For this reason, Allah the Exalted said: And He said: Even though Allah said: So He affirmed the annoyance and denied the harm. So if your father boycotts you or is angry with you, then that does not harm you, but there is no doubt that it annoys you. Otherwise, you will eat, drink, wear clothes, and do all your needs, and this will not harm you. Yes.