Explanation of the author's statement: "Or freeing a slave"
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The Shaykh :"Or freeing a slave" Freeing means liberating the slave and releasing them from slavery. The author’s statement "freeing a slave" is general, so the apparent meaning of his words is that any slave suffices, even if they are a disbeliever. This is the position of Imam Abu Hanifa and his followers, Ibn al-Mundhir, and a group of scholars. They said this because Allah the Exalted used general terms, saying [Al-Ma'idah 5:89] and He used general terms. However, in the expiation for killing, He said [An-Nisa 4:92] [An-Nisa 4:92] So Allah the Exalted restricted it to faith in the noble verse. In the expiation for killing, He restricted it, but in the expiation for an oath, He used general terms, and in the expiation for zihar, He used general terms. It is not for us to restrict what Allah has made general. If we say that there is no feeding in the expiation for killing because it was not mentioned, then likewise we say that faith is not a condition in the expiation for oaths and the expiation for zihar because it was not mentioned. Then we say again: in the verse on killing, Allah made faith a condition in two places. Let us read: [An-Nisa 4:92] See, it is restricted. [An-Nisa 4:92]
The questioner : Three.
The Shaykh : Not two places.
The questioner : ... .
The Shaykh : Two places. That one is in another context. That one is[An-Nisa 4:92] Do you mean this? This is the one who was killed.
The questioner : ... .
Another questioner: You mentioned it three times.
The Shaykh : Let us read it, let us read it a second time:[An-Nisa 4:92]
The questioner : Three times.
The Shaykh : Yes?
The questioner : ... .
The Shaykh :[An-Nisa 4:92] .
The questioner : Three.
The Shaykh : You are not going to overpower us, people, three?
The questioner : Yes, indeed.
The Shaykh : Okay, three times the slave was restricted by faith, even though if we were to say that we apply the principle of restricting the general with the specific, it would suffice for it to be restricted in the noble verse, right? Once, and then the other two would be applied to it. But since every time freeing is mentioned, it is restricted by faith, and the cause is one, which is killing a soul that is held sacred, this indicates that faith is not a condition in the expiation for an oath, the expiation for zihar, and the expiation for intercourse during the day of Ramadan. Especially since regarding intercourse during the day of Ramadan, the Messenger of Allah asks the man who owes the expiation, saying:Sahih al-Bukhari 6711 and he did not tell him "a believing woman," even though the context required him to say so. Therefore, this position is very strong, which is the position of Abu Hanifa, Ibn al-Mundhir, and a group of scholars; it was a strong position. As for those who said that faith is a condition, they argued with the well-known principle that the general is restricted by the specific if the ruling is one. Do you understand?
The questioner : Yes, indeed.
The Shaykh : If the matter does not settle, then faith is a condition in it by way of analogy. The way to conduct the analogy is to say: a slave is obligated to be freed to exit from the sin, so faith was made a condition in it, like the slave that is obligatory in accidental killing. Pay attention, yes?
The questioner : ... .
The Shaykh : That it is a slave that is obligatory for an expiation, so faith was made a condition in it. No, yes, to exit from the anticipated sin, so faith was made a condition in it, like the expiation for killing. Okay, so we have an analogy here, and the second is applying the general to the specific. But this may be opposed. As for the first, which is applying the general to the specific, we may say that there is no application here because the ruling is different. In the expiation for killing, there is freeing and fasting without feeding. In the expiation for zihar, there is freeing and fasting, and what else? And feeding. And likewise in the expiation for intercourse during the day of Ramadan, there is freeing and fasting and feeding. In the expiation for an oath, the difference is clear, or is it not? Feeding, clothing, and fasting. And it also differs clearly from the expiation for killing. And we also say the cause is different, even though a difference in cause does not affect the ruling, but it must have a greater effect on the ruling. As for the argument by analogy, the analogy may also be prohibited. Why? Because killing is a greater sin than the expiation for an oath, greater than the expiation for an oath. The violation in the expiation for an oath is permissible, and killing is forbidden and severely prohibited. Therefore, this is not analogous to that. If you ask by what do you answer regarding the hadith of Mu'awiyah ibn al-Hakam, when he informed the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) that he had a slave girl whom he was angry with and he struck her, meaning he hit her, and that he wanted to free her, so the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) called for her and said to her: She said: "In the sky" He said: She said: "You are the Messenger of Allah" He said: So his statement "Free her" means that this phrase is an explanation, meaning because of her faith, free her. Does this not indicate that the non-believer is not a place for freeing, because the Messenger said: Yes?
The questioner : ... .
The Shaykh : Not a place for freeing, yes, so this implies that faith is a condition. Also, if we free a disbeliever, they are liberated and it is not certain that they will join the abode of disbelief, because they have become free. What is the original state of slavery? The original state of slavery is disbelief, meaning we do not enslave the children of Adam except because of disbelief. So here, someone may also say that it is feared that if a slave is freed and liberated and no one has authority over them, they will join the abode of disbelief, and in that there is harm for them and harm for us. Harm for them, because if they go to the abode of disbelief, they are farther from Islam than if they remained in the abode of Islam. And harm for us, because they may aid them against us one day, especially if they hold a grudge against the Muslims and are brave and strong, we do not feel safe. Do you understand? Therefore, we say we do not free a disbeliever absolutely. The original freeing of a disbeliever is not established unless they become Muslim. This is actually what prevents a person from preferring the general meaning in the expiation for an oath and the expiation for zihar. So if a person, meaning if we want to exit from the ambiguous matters, because the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings be upon him) says:Musannaf Ibn Abi Shaybah 12:2035 If we want to exit from the ambiguous, we say we do not free except a believer, because if you free a believing woman, you clear your obligation without dispute. And if you free a disbeliever, you clear your obligation according to one of the opinions, which may be the correct one with Allah, and the correct one may be the opposite. This is if someone comes to ask us at the beginning of the matter, we say free a believing slave, so this is safer for you and avoid doubtful matters. But a man who has already freed a slave and saw that he cleared his obligation, either out of ignorance or by following the opinion of some scholars, we do not order him to repeat the freeing, because our ordering him to repeat the freeing implies judging him with what? Judging him with a financial penalty, which is a matter not certain. So we would have committed the harm of imposing a penalty without clear evidence. And at that time, judging him as having cleared his obligation is the precaution, or is it not? Right?
The questioner : It is not.
Another questioner: ...
The Shaykh : This is a man who freed a slave and it is done. If we say your freeing is not sufficient, we have imposed a penalty on him now, because he will free a new slave. The first one was freed. So here, is the precaution to impose a penalty on him and oblige him to free a new slave, while we are in doubt about it, or is the precaution not to impose a penalty on you?
The questioner : ... .
The Shaykh : The second is the precaution. And for this reason, many scholars in such doubtful matters where the evidence is opposed or the opinions of scholars are balanced, if there is no evidence that distinguishes between the thing after it has occurred and the thing before it occurs, they say: before it occurs, we take the safer course, and after it occurs, we also take the safer course, which is not invalidating the worship or not imposing a penalty, or something similar. Okay.
So its expiation is the feeding of ten needy people from the average of that which you feed your [own] families or clothing them or the freeing of a slave
فَكَفَّارَتُهُ إِطْعامُ عَشَرَةِ مَساكِينَ مِنْ أَوْسَطِ مَا تُطْعِمُونَ أَهْلِيكُمْ أَوْ كِسْوَتُهُمْ أَوْ تَحْرِيرُ رَقَبَةٍthe freeing of a believing slave; and if he was from a people with whom you have a treaty - then a compensation payment presented to his family and the freeing of a believing slave
فتحرير رقبة مؤمنة وَإِنْ كانَ مِنْ قَوْمٍ بَيْنَكُمْ وَبَيْنَهُمْ مِيثاقٌ فَدِيَةٌ مُسَلَّمَةٌ إِلى أَهْلِهِ وَتَحْرِيرُ رَقَبَةٍ مُؤْمِنَةٍAnd whoever kills a believer by mistake - then the freeing of a believing slave
وَمَنْ قَتَلَ مُؤْمِناً خَطَأً فَتَحْرِيرُ رَقَبَةٍ مُؤْمِنَةٍAnd never is it for a believer to kill a believer except by mistake. And whoever kills a believer by mistake - then the freeing of a believing slave
وَما كانَ لِمُؤْمِنٍ أَنْ يَقْتُلَ مُؤْمِناً إِلاَّ خَطَأً وَمَنْ قَتَلَ مُؤْمِناً خَطَأً فَتَحْرِيرُ رَقَبَةٍ مُؤْمِنَةٍa compensation payment presented to the deceased's family [is required] unless they give [up their right as] charity. But if the deceased was from a people at war with you and he was a believer - then [only] the freeing of a believing slave; and if he was from a people with whom you have a treaty - then a compensation payment presented to his family and the freeing of a believing slave
وَدِيَةٌ مُسَلَّمَةٌ إِلى أَهْلِهِ إِلاَّ أَنْ يَصَّدَّقُوا فَإِنْ كانَ مِنْ قَوْمٍ عَدُوٍّ لَكُمْ وَهُوَ مُؤْمِنٌ فَتَحْرِيرُ رَقَبَةٍ مُؤْمِنَةٍ وَإِنْ كانَ مِنْ قَوْمٍ بَيْنَكُمْ وَبَيْنَهُمْ مِيثاقٌ فَدِيَةٌ مُسَلَّمَةٌ إِلى أَهْلِهِ وَتَحْرِيرُ رَقَبَةٍ مُؤْمِنَةٍThe questioner : Three.
The Shaykh : Not two places.
The questioner : ... .
The Shaykh : Two places. That one is in another context. That one is
But if the deceased was from a people at war with you and he was a believer
فَإِنْ كانَ مِنْ قَوْمٍ عَدُوٍّ لَكُمْ وَهُوَ مُؤْمِنٌThe questioner : ... .
Another questioner: You mentioned it three times.
The Shaykh : Let us read it, let us read it a second time:
And whoever kills a believer by mistake - then the freeing of a believing slave and a compensation payment presented to the deceased's family [is required] unless they give [up their right as] charity. But if the deceased was from a people at war with you and he was a believer - then [only] the freeing of a believing slave
وَمَنْ قَتَلَ مُؤْمِناً خَطَأً فَتَحْرِيرُ رَقَبَةٍ مُؤْمِنَةٍ وَدِيَةٌ مُسَلَّمَةٌ إِلى أَهْلِهِ إِلاَّ أَنْ يَصَّدَّقُوا فَإِنْ كانَ مِنْ قَوْمٍ عَدُوٍّ لَكُمْ وَهُوَ مُؤْمِنٌ فَتَحْرِيرُ رَقَبَةٍ مُؤْمِنَةٍThe questioner : Three times.
The Shaykh : Yes?
The questioner : ... .
The Shaykh :
and if he was from a people with whom you have a treaty - then a compensation payment presented to his family and the freeing of a believing slave
وَإِنْ كانَ مِنْ قَوْمٍ بَيْنَكُمْ وَبَيْنَهُمْ مِيثاقٌ فَدِيَةٌ مُسَلَّمَةٌ إِلى أَهْلِهِ وَتَحْرِيرُ رَقَبَةٍ مُؤْمِنَةٍThe questioner : Three.
The Shaykh : You are not going to overpower us, people, three?
The questioner : Yes, indeed.
The Shaykh : Okay, three times the slave was restricted by faith, even though if we were to say that we apply the principle of restricting the general with the specific, it would suffice for it to be restricted in the noble verse, right? Once, and then the other two would be applied to it. But since every time freeing is mentioned, it is restricted by faith, and the cause is one, which is killing a soul that is held sacred, this indicates that faith is not a condition in the expiation for an oath, the expiation for zihar, and the expiation for intercourse during the day of Ramadan. Especially since regarding intercourse during the day of Ramadan, the Messenger of Allah asks the man who owes the expiation, saying:
Can you afford to manumit a slave?
هل تجد ما تُعتق رقبةThe questioner : Yes, indeed.
The Shaykh : If the matter does not settle, then faith is a condition in it by way of analogy. The way to conduct the analogy is to say: a slave is obligated to be freed to exit from the sin, so faith was made a condition in it, like the slave that is obligatory in accidental killing. Pay attention, yes?
The questioner : ... .
The Shaykh : That it is a slave that is obligatory for an expiation, so faith was made a condition in it. No, yes, to exit from the anticipated sin, so faith was made a condition in it, like the expiation for killing. Okay, so we have an analogy here, and the second is applying the general to the specific. But this may be opposed. As for the first, which is applying the general to the specific, we may say that there is no application here because the ruling is different. In the expiation for killing, there is freeing and fasting without feeding. In the expiation for zihar, there is freeing and fasting, and what else? And feeding. And likewise in the expiation for intercourse during the day of Ramadan, there is freeing and fasting and feeding. In the expiation for an oath, the difference is clear, or is it not? Feeding, clothing, and fasting. And it also differs clearly from the expiation for killing. And we also say the cause is different, even though a difference in cause does not affect the ruling, but it must have a greater effect on the ruling. As for the argument by analogy, the analogy may also be prohibited. Why? Because killing is a greater sin than the expiation for an oath, greater than the expiation for an oath. The violation in the expiation for an oath is permissible, and killing is forbidden and severely prohibited. Therefore, this is not analogous to that. If you ask by what do you answer regarding the hadith of Mu'awiyah ibn al-Hakam, when he informed the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) that he had a slave girl whom he was angry with and he struck her, meaning he hit her, and that he wanted to free her, so the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) called for her and said to her:
Where is Allah?
أين الله؟Who am I?
من أنا؟Set her free, for she is a believer
أعتقها فإنها مؤمنةSet her free, for she is a believer
أعتقها فإنها مؤمنةThe questioner : ... .
The Shaykh : Not a place for freeing, yes, so this implies that faith is a condition. Also, if we free a disbeliever, they are liberated and it is not certain that they will join the abode of disbelief, because they have become free. What is the original state of slavery? The original state of slavery is disbelief, meaning we do not enslave the children of Adam except because of disbelief. So here, someone may also say that it is feared that if a slave is freed and liberated and no one has authority over them, they will join the abode of disbelief, and in that there is harm for them and harm for us. Harm for them, because if they go to the abode of disbelief, they are farther from Islam than if they remained in the abode of Islam. And harm for us, because they may aid them against us one day, especially if they hold a grudge against the Muslims and are brave and strong, we do not feel safe. Do you understand? Therefore, we say we do not free a disbeliever absolutely. The original freeing of a disbeliever is not established unless they become Muslim. This is actually what prevents a person from preferring the general meaning in the expiation for an oath and the expiation for zihar. So if a person, meaning if we want to exit from the ambiguous matters, because the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings be upon him) says:
The lawful is clear and the forbidden is clear, and between them are matters about which there is doubt.
الحلال بيّن والحرام بيّن وبينهما أمور مشتبهاتThe questioner : It is not.
Another questioner: ...
The Shaykh : This is a man who freed a slave and it is done. If we say your freeing is not sufficient, we have imposed a penalty on him now, because he will free a new slave. The first one was freed. So here, is the precaution to impose a penalty on him and oblige him to free a new slave, while we are in doubt about it, or is the precaution not to impose a penalty on you?
The questioner : ... .
The Shaykh : The second is the precaution. And for this reason, many scholars in such doubtful matters where the evidence is opposed or the opinions of scholars are balanced, if there is no evidence that distinguishes between the thing after it has occurred and the thing before it occurs, they say: before it occurs, we take the safer course, and after it occurs, we also take the safer course, which is not invalidating the worship or not imposing a penalty, or something similar. Okay.